This paper examines China's implementation and management of grain TRQs (tariff-rate quotas) since its accession to the WTO in late 2001. Our study shows that since 2001 China's total grain trade volume has increased significantly and net grain imports have also increased. While China has done well to fulfil its WTO entry commitments, its trade policies were generally in favour of encouraging domestic grain production. Chiefly influenced by domestic demand-supply situations coupled with policies promoting domestic supply, China's grain imports and exports in the past five years fluctuated and the utilisation of the grain TRQs has been low. Whether China's grain TRQ usage will increase and how its grain trade policy will evolve will continue to be affected by domestic grain supply and demand, and also by the outcomes of bilateral and multilateral free trade negotiations.
Introduction
In December 2001, China was accepted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Many anticipated that, following China's accession to WTO, its grain imports would increase rapidly. To mitigate the likely strong shock on Chinese grain producers' income and its grains industry, China was allowed a "transition period" of five years, till the end of 2006. During this period, China's grain imports would be managed under a TRQ (tariff-rate quota) arrangement. That is, if the imports are within the quota, a lower in-quote tariff will be charged; otherwise, a much higher out-quote tariff applies. The higher above-quota tariff would discourage imports and thus would provide protection to Chinese farmers and its grains industry.
Five years have passed since China became a member of the WTO. Then, what has happened to China's grain trade under the TRQ arrangement? How did China implement the grains TRQ? Were China's TRQ practices in alignment with WTO rules? Such questions have continuously drawn much interest from grain traders and many international observers. Australia, as a major grain exporter, has also paid much attention to look for answers to such questions.
2 So far, however, little effort has been made to examine China's grain TRQ implementation and management. This study attempts to fill this gap.
In the next section, we first provide an overview over the developments in China's grain trade and its trade policies in the past five years. This is important because an understanding of China's grain TRQ practice must be placed in the broader context of issues that affect China's grain imports and grain trade policies. In Section 3, we examine China's grain TRQ implementation and management. Section 4 discusses the prospects of China's grain TRQ practices as well as the likely trade policy developments. The last section concludes the paper.
Developments of China's Grain Trade and Trade Policies since 2001

Grain Trade
Since 2001, China's grain trade (not including soybean) followed no clear pattern. 3 The amount of imports, exports as well as net imports changed between years, and often abruptly (see Table 1 ). If soybean is included, total grain imports show a trend of increasing while total grain exports tend to change between years. However, China's net imports are increasing.
[ Table 1 here] At the crop level, while the level of soybean export has been stagnant, its import has increased rapidly in the past few years (see Parts A and B of Table 1 ). Soybean imports account for a major proportion of China's total grain imports; around 80-90%. China's barley trade is one way: it imports a relatively large amount of high quality barley chiefly for brewing purposes. China was able to net export a significant amount of corn even after joining the WTO. However, the level of export has declined rapidly in the recent years. China has been a net rice exporter but its export level has dramatically dropped since 2003 (see Part C of Table 1 ). Over the past five years, China's wheat trade has been most erratic. In 2002, the first year after China's joining the WTO, China was a net wheat exporter although the volume was small. The net wheat export in the following year, 2003, however, was significant, being over 2 mt. This was followed by a dramatic net wheat import increase in 2004 to be about 6.5 mt. It dropped to about 3 mt in 2005. In 2006, China was again net-exporting wheat to the world market (Part C of Table 1 ).
Comparing with the trade level before WTO accession, China's total grain trade (both imports and exports) since 2001 has increased (see Figure 1) . During 1990 During -2006 , the annual growth rate of grain trade was 4.1%. Prior to the accession, namely, 1990-2001, the growth rate was 2.8% with an annual average trade volume being 22 mt. Since 2001, the growth rate has jumped to about 7% with an annual average trade volume being 38.7 mt.
[ Figure 1 here] There have also been noticeable changes in the composition of grain imports after the WTO accession. Excluding soybean, the proportion of wheat import has increased sharply, from 22% in 1999-2001 to 58% in 2004-06 (Figure 2 ). On the other hand, the proportion of barley import out of total grain imports has declined from 71% to 31%. The changes in the proportion of rice and corn are relatively small. The three-year average annual grain import (not including soybean, 2004-06) has more than doubled that of 1999-2001.
[ Figure 2 here] The above discussion shows that China's total grain trade and grain net imports have increased after WTO accession. Thus, to some extent, China's accession to the WTO may have led to increased grain trade between China and the rest of the world. However, five years is relatively a short time and to what extent China's increased grain trade and net imports can be attributed to WTO accession requires further research. In this regard, two issues are worth particular mention: the sharp increase in soybean import and China's pragmatic approach to grain trade. A brief account on each follows. Table 1 clearly shows that China's recent grain imports is chiefly due to the fast increase in soybean imports. On average, soybean imports account for 82% of total grain imports during 2002-06. Excluding soybean, China's total grain imports are relatively small (comparing with its domestic total consumption) and in fact, four out of the five years, China was a net grain exporter (Parts A and C, Table 1 ). Given that soybean import is no longer subject to TRQ restrictions, in the rest of the paper, our discussion will focus on other grains, chiefly, major cereals -wheat, rice and corn. 4 China follows a very pragmatic approach to its grain trade, attaching much weight to protecting producers' income and ensuring national food security. China exports or imports grains when such a need arises. A quick review of what China did since the early 1990s will explain this. In the mid-1990s, China's grain supply was believed to be in shortage. The government decided to import grains in large volumes and also took measures to promote grain production. Consequently, domestic grain output increased, and by the late 1990s and early 2000s, China had accumulated large volumes of grains. As part of the response to declining domestic prices, the government encouraged grain export (chiefly corn, see Part B, Table 1 ) and China's net grain export increased during [2002] [2003] . Following grain price increases in late 2003 and early 2004, the government reduced incentives for grain exports and facilitated grain imports. In 2004, China became a net grain importer. During 2004-05 the government also took various measures to boost grain production. China's domestic production increased and in 2005, China again became a net grain exporter. This tends to suggest that China's grain trade is to a greater extent dependent upon China's domestic demand and supply situations and on China's needs for grain security but to a lesser extent influenced by WTO accession; at least this was the case for the past few years. As such, it is valuable to look into policy issues that affect China's grain demand and supply conditions which in turn affect China's grain trade practices.
Grain Trade Policy
Our discussion on China's grain trade policy developments in the past five years is chiefly focused on the following three aspects: market access, export subsidy, and domestic support.
Market access
After WTO accession, TRQs are applied to imports of some agricultural products such as grains (wheat, corn and rice), cotton, cooking oil, sugar and wool. The imports of some other agricultural products such as soybean, barley, horticultural products and animal products are subject to a single tariff rate only. Reduced import tariff rates improved the access of foreign agricultural products to the Chinese market. In addition to the tariff rate reduction, China also made changes to import procedures of some key agricultural products that made exports of such products to China easier. For example, in 2004, wool imports were no longer confined to those designated agents but any traders could import wool. Prior to 2006, a fixed proportion of cooking oil had to be imported only by state trading enterprises (STEs). On 1 January 2006, this proportion was abolished. Thus, it can be seen that TRQs are the only means used by China to influence the access of a small number of foreign agricultural products, including grains, to the Chinese market. As far as grain exports to China are concerned, one can export as much grain as one wishes up to the quota to enjoy the very low level of in-quota tariff rates. When the quota is fulfilled, one can still export grains to China so long as one is prepared to bear the higher out-quota tariff rates. It is interesting to note, however, the utilisation of the grain TRQs in the past five years has been low. In 2004, grain import was the highest since WTO accession, being 8.02 mt. Yet total grain imports accounted for only 36% of the total quota. Details about the TRQ utilisation and why the utilisation is low are given later in this paper.
Export subsidy
China agreed to abolish all export subsidies at the time of WTO accession. Since 2002, two measures were introduced that have had impact on China's grain exports: tax rebates on grain exports and exemption of railway construction levies for grain transportation.
Tax rebates on grain exports. On 1 January 2002, the State Council approved that a zero value-added tax (VAT) would be applied to rice, wheat and corn exports and sales tax imposed on these grains exported would be fully refunded (Ministry of the Treasury and State Taxation Bureau 2002). In 2003, the rate of rebates for processed products out of wheat, corn and so on was further increased, from 5% to 13% (Ministry of the Treasury and State Taxation Bureau 2002). It is noted that the use of tax rebates is allowed by WTO rules (Chen and Liu 2002) . Such rebates increase China's grain export competitiveness in the world market.
Exemption of railway construction levies for grain transportation. Starting from 1 April 2002, paddy and rice, wheat and wheat flour, corn and soybean were exempted from railway construction levies (State Development and Planning Commission 2002) . 5 This exemption was to be terminated by the end of 2005. However, this policy measure is currently still in use and is expected to continue into the foreseeable future. This measure significantly reduced the transportation cost of grains. According to Wu (2006) , the railway construction levy accounts for about 30-40% of total transportation costs of grains. Its exemption, on average, would have reduced rail transportation cost of corn by 40%. This also explains partly why China's corn exports were high in the early years of this decade.
Domestic support
To become a member of the WTO, China committed that its domestic support to agricultural products would not exceed 8.5% of the value of total agricultural production.
6 China used to milk agricultural sector and had a negative support to agricultural production (Tian et al. 2002) . Consequently, there is so much room for China to increase its domestic support level. Nonetheless, its current support level was merely 0.6% and was far below the level agreed at the WTO accession (Wu 2006) . Despite the still very low level of domestic support, China did indeed initiate or continue some measures that would directly or indirectly increase its domestic support to agricultural production. "Abolishment of two taxes" and "three agricultural subsidies". The two taxes abolished are "agricultural tax" and "taxes on special agricultural products" (excluding tobacco). Three subsidies are "direct subsidy to grain production", "subsidy to the adoption of improved seeds", and "subsidy to the acquisition of farm machinery". At the beginning of 2006, farmers nationwide were free from paying agricultural tax. 7 Since 2002, China's "three agricultural subsidies" have increased significantly, from 0.1 billion yuan in 2002 to over 30 billion yuan in 2006 (see Table 2 ). Such subsidies provided incentives to farmers to produce grains and also enhanced China's grain production capacity.
[ Table 3 here] Continuation of grain procurement under minimum support prices. In the early 1990's, China introduced a minimum support price (MSP) scheme for grain procurement. After WTO accession, in order to protect the income of farmers in major grain producing regions, this MSP measure was continued, chiefly for paddy and wheat. In 2005, the MSP was effective for rice. In 2006, the government also procured wheat under MSP. MSP provides assurance to grain producers and encourages farmers to produce grains.
Assistance to agricultural insurance. In June 2006, agricultural insurance was included as part of China's broad agricultural support system. It was made clear that subsidies would be provided to farmers, insurance companies, and agricultural re-insurance efforts. The funds would come from both the central and local governments. Through the insurance assistance, the government provides indirect support and protection to the farmers. Subsidy to agricultural insurance falls into the "Green Box" as allowed by WTO. Many developed countries also make use of such a subsidy as a means to provide support to their agricultural production.
China's Grains TRQs: Implementation and Management
Imports of three major grains, i.e., wheat, rice and corn, are subject to TRQs after China's WTO accession. The tariff rates for in-quota imports are low, being 1% for raw grains, and less than 10% for processed grain products. Tariff rates for out-quota imports are much higher. The Chinese government promised to make reforms and adjustments to grains trade over the following years after the accession in 2001. More specifically, proposed major changes include: (1) reduce the out-quota tariff rates for grains subject to TRQs (from 74% in 2001 to 65% in 2004); (2) increase TRQs (for wheat, corn and rice, from 8.468 mt, 5.85 mt and 3.99 mt in 2002 to 9.636 mt, 7.2 mt and 5.32 mt in 2004, respectively); and (3) reduce the proportion of corn imports designated to STEs and increase the proportion to be traded by other participants. Details of proposed changes in out-quota tariff rates and the proportion designated to STEs can be found in Table 3. [ Table 3 here] 3.1 Grain TRQ Allocation 8
In China, the management of agricultural import TRQs is carried out by different government departments according to their administrative roles. For example, grain TRQs are managed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which also manages cotton TRQs. TRQs of vegetable cooking oils, sugar and wool are managed by the Ministry of Commerce. Highlighted below are general management issues concerning the application, allocation and re-distribution of grain TRQs.
The NDRC predicts the amount of imports required in a calendar year and submits a request to the State Council. After the approval by the State Council, the NDRC is in a position to distribute the import quotas among traders including STEs. China's WTO agreement allows China's STEs to import grains under the TRQ arrangement at a pre-determined proportion. Currently the STE that is designated to handle TRQ imports of grain is COFCO Limited. It has the privilege to be allocated a certain portion of the total grain import TRQs from the NDRC. The remaining TRQs are distributed to other traders according to the following general principle and approach. (1) If the remaining amount of TRQs is great than the amount requested, all traders eligible for applying for a TRQ are allocated the amount they applied for.
(2) If the amount is smaller than the total amount requested, then those who have grain import experience are allocated the TRQs first. The leftover is then distributed among those who have not previously imported grains.
Non-STE traders need to apply to the agents of the NRDC scattered in various provinces between 15 and 30 October each year for an import quota for the next calendar year. The NRDC then determines the amount to be granted based on the approach described above (i.e., trader's past import performance, trader's grain processing capacities, with reference to various other commercial considerations). After the amount is determined, the NDRC, through its agents, issues an "agricultural import TRQ permit" to a trader no later than 31 December of the current year for imports in the next calendar year. The TRQs must be utilised by the traders within a calendar year. If the imports have departed the origin port before 31 December but can only arrive at a port in China sometime in the next calendar year, the trader must apply for an extension. The extension, however, is generally not beyond the end of February of the next calendar year.
If a trader cannot utilise all the allocated TRQs, the unused TRQs must be returned to the NDRC before 15 September. The returned TRQs will be redistributed. Application for redistributed TRQs takes place between 1 and 15 September. Returned TRQs are redistributed to traders according to the order of their applications. Before 1 October, the NDRC informs the traders of the results of their application for extra TRQs through redistribution.
Hence, the initial procedure used by China to distribute the grain TRQs after its WTO accession may be shown as below:
This procedure is troublesome for traders. If a trader managed to secure a contract with a foreign supplier but then the TRQ import permit is not granted or not granted in full for the amount specified in the contract, the traders cannot make the purchase, leaving both the trader and supplier in difficult situation. In 2003, modifications were made to make the procedure simpler and taking less time to obtain a permit. The simplified procedure is shown below and it has made it much easier for traders to conduct their businesses.
Notice to traders
Negotiate a contract between traders and suppliers Apply for an import TRQ
Grant a permit
Apply for an import TRQ
Negotiate a contract between traders and suppliers
Grain TRQ Utilisation
China's grain TRQ utilisation has been low since its WTO accession although its utilisation of the TRQs for some other agricultural products has increased and has reached a relatively high level. For example, during 2002-2005, the TRQ usage of sugar, soybean oil and wool exceeded 60% (Han 2005) . According to official statistics, the actual imports of palm oil more than doubled the TRQ amount. The imports of cotton were also 1.6 times of the TRQ amount. On the other hand, the grain TRQ utilisation has been relatively low, being about 15%. At the product level, the utilisation of wheat TRQ is slightly higher, being 30%, while that of rice and corn is 9% and 0.05%, respectively.
9 In 2006, the TRQ usage remained to be low. Table 4 [ Table 4 here] Table 5 shows the sources of grains imported under the TRQ arrangement. Canada, Australia, France and the USA are the major sources of wheat imports. Corn chiefly comes from the USA and Laos. Thailand is the major source of rice imports. Apart from those designated STEs, those who imported grains are mainly some large grain processors or traders located in cities along China's southeast coast. In terms of the usage of imported grains, higher protein wheat imported from Canada and the USA is chiefly used for bread production while wheat with lower protein content from Australia is primarily used to produce biscuits and other processed foods. Rice and corn are also used for industrial purposes or food processing.
[ Table 5 here]
Factors Affecting Grain TRQ Utilisation
According to Table 4 , the utilisation of the grains TRQs has been relatively low in the past five years. The rates of utilisation also differ significantly among the three major grains, namely, wheat, rice and corn. In principle, restrictions imposed by TRQs on imports depend on the out-quote tariff rates specified. If trading parties are willing to trade at the out-quota tariff rates, then imports are not restricted by TRQs. Since the out-quota tariff rates are generally very high, under normal circumstances, trading generally does not take place at the out-quota tariff rates. However, in the past five years there was no need for China to import grains at the out-quota tariff rates, since a large portion of the grain TRQs had not been utilised. Then, what are the major factors that led to China's low utilisation of grain TRQs?
Price differentials directly affect the demand for imported grains. It is widely accepted that imported foodgrains generally possess higher quality. However, imported grains have to bear extra transaction costs, including, for example, transportation, in-quota tariff, VAT. Higher costs translate into higher prices, leading to reduced demand for imported grains. It is noted that China collects a 13% VAT on import. Hence, even if the nominal tariff rates are reduced to zero, this import VAT can still effectively dampen down the price competitiveness of imported grains.
Increased support for domestic grain production reduces the need for imports. To a great extent, domestic grain demand and supply situations dictate a country's grains trade. Increased incentives to farmers for greater production improved China's domestic supply, which in turn has led to reduced needs for imports. Discussion in the earlier section clearly shows that China's domestic support to grain production has been on the increase since its WTO accession, particularly after 2003 when China experienced another major reduction in grain output and the subsequent price increases in the grain market.
TRQ allocation and implementation to some extent limits grain imports. Grain TRQs are first divided between STEs and non-STE traders. A large portion of the TRQs is assigned to STEs. If STEs cannot use up all the assigned TRQs, with the approval by the NDRC, the unused TRQs will be allocated to non-STE traders who have a right to import and export. Procedures to allocate the TRQs to private traders also had impeded grain imports. As pointed out earlier in this section, the allocation and re-distribution of TRQs to non-STE traders, though largely reasonable, could indeed sometime lead to difficulties in grain imports. Recently, the government has made efforts to improving the TRQ administration.
Higher quality grains produced domestically substitute imports. In the past, small-scale farm production coupled with inadequate grain marketing facilities made it very difficult for China to produce grains of the desired quality at the desired quantity for specific usages (Zhou and Tian 2006) . First, the quality of grains varies from farm to farm. Second, grains of better quality are often not handled separately, due to either lack of facilities or the small quantity. As a result, China often imports grains, esp., wheat, of high quality for some special usages. Recently, more attention has been given to the production of higher quality grains through some innovative arrangements between food-processing firms and farms (such as "ding dan nong ye" -a kind of contract farming, under such arrangements firms usually provide farmers with technical assistance to produce wheat with desired attributes) (MOA 2003, p. 8) .
Grain export incentives encouraged corn export. As pointed out earlier, after WTO accession, grain exports attract a zero value-added tax and sales tax on grains exported would be fully refunded. Further, no railway construction levies would be imposed on grain transported which can reduce rail transportation cost by about 40%. The combination of such incentives made it still worthwhile for China to export corn at the world market price. China exported a large amount of corn during 2002-06 (over 42 mt) and its corn TRQ usage is almost zero (see Table 4 ). According to the above, China's very low-level usage of the grain TRQs is chiefly due to its domestic supply-demand situations. Its grain production and subsidy policies encouraged domestic production and also industrial adjustments to produce grains to meet market demand. Export incentives encouraged grain exports while the implementation of grain TRQs was not always conducive to grain imports. Will China be able to maintain such a low level of grain imports into the near future? This largely depends upon its domestic grain supply-demand situations and the outcomes of its bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.
China's Grain Trade and Policy Prospects
China's fast economic growth in the past three decades has led to the rapid expansion of nonagricultural sectors, resulting in a continuous decline in the proportion of agricultural GDP out of total GDP. In 1978, when China's economic reform started, agricultural GDP accounted for 28.2% of total GDP. This proportion, however, had dropped to 15.2% by 2001 and has further drooped to 11.8% by (SSB 2007 . Many agricultural activities are likely to further lose their comparative advantage as the economic returns of non-agricultural activities continue to improve. Declining comparative advantages in agriculture lead to resources deviated to non-agricultural uses, such as water and land. Without the advent of significant technological breakthrough (such as effective yield-augmenting measures), it will be difficult for China's agricultural sector to further increase its output. On the other hand, with improved purchasing power, consumers' demand for agricultural products, esp., higher quality products, has been increasing and will continue to do so into the future.
As far as grain is concerned, grain production is land intensive. The production of some grain crops is rapidly losing their comparative advantages (e.g., rice production in southeast coastal regions). As a result, farmers shift their resources to other economic activities (Zhou and Tian 2006) . For example, total area sown to grain crops declined from 106.1 million ha. in 2001 to 99.4 million ha. in 2003; the area increased to 105.5 million ha. by 2006 due to strong government incentives to grow grain (SSB 2007, p. 132) . However, China's demand for grains is still increasing -although direct consumption has declined, indirect consumption of grains has been increasing due to increased demand for animal products and for processed food. According to Zhou and Tian (2003) , China's demand for feedgrains has been increasing and will become the major component of China's total grain demand. Any future increase in total grain demand in China will be mainly caused by an increasing demand for feedgrains. On the other hand, many believe that China will not be able to meet the increased demand for grains in general and feedgrains in particular with its domestic supply (Garnaut and Ma 1992; RGCFDS 1993; Crook and Colby 1996; Findlay 1998; Tian and Chudleigh 1999; Chen 2004; and Zhou and Tian 2005) . There are two broad approaches China can use to increase its total grain supply: (1) to further increase domestic supply, and (2) to increase grain imports.
The potential of the first option is limited as has been pointed out due to the declining comparative advantage of grain production. Likely future changes in resource allocation and pricing (e.g., deviation of land, labour force, and water away from agriculture, and possible charges on water use) will further erode China's comparative advantage in grain production. Should China insist to increase grain supply from domestic production to meet the increasing demand, the cost, both economically and environmentally, can be large. Hence, increasing grain imports is likely to be the chief method for China to increase its total grain supply to match the rising demand. Although China's future grain imports are expected to increase (Chen 2004, Zhou and Tian 2005) , policies regarding market access are unlikely to have significant changes in the immediate future. As a result of the failure of the Doha Round, it is to China's interest to maintain the current market access policies unchanged unless China needs to significantly increase its grain imports. Any major changes in market access policies will also depend upon the progress and outcomes of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. In regard to multilateral negotiations, the recent WTO Delhi meeting is unlikely to significantly revive the negotiation process. When negotiations do get restarted, WTO members with major grain exports may press China to further open its grain market. They are likely to pay more attention to the allocation and management of the grain TRQs if the grain TRQs are continued.
China has become increasingly engaged in bilateral trade negotiations in recent years, for example, with ASEAN, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. The negotiations with ASEAN and Chile have been concluded. China-ASEAN FTA was put into practice on 20 July 2005 while the implementation of China-Chile FTA was started on 1 October 2006. Cereal exports to China from these countries will enjoy reduced tariffs. It seems that it is a very wise strategic choice, through bilateral FTAs, for China to maintain close economic and trade relationships with some key grain-exporting countries. This will enable China to secure a relatively diverse source of grain suppliers and will help China to establish a stable source of grain supply. This can be a very important strategy that will help China to achieve its longterm national grain security.
However, some argued that increased trade liberalisation does not necessarily ensure China's rural development and increase farmers' income (Shui 2006, p. 192) . Currently, raising farmers' income, protecting rural employment, and reducing rural poverty are major challenges faced by the Chinese government. Grain production remains a major source of income for many small Chinese farms and China may have to rely on this industry to provide the livelihood for many Chinese farmers for years to come. Thus, it may be anticipated that China can be very sensitive in regard to the level of access for imported grains to the Chinese market. However, in future negotiations, trading partners are most likely to ask China to further open its grain market. Further, there are the needs for China to import more grains. Consequently, the Chinese government may at times adjust its grain trade policies, either voluntarily or passively. However, any major such adjustments would be still based chiefly on changes in China's domestic grain demand and supply situations.
Conclusions and Implications
Five years since China's WTO accession, there have been some notable adjustments in China's grain trade policies. Domestic subsidy has evolved from providing chiefly price support to both price and income support. Such support has increased rapidly in the past five years in order to promote domestic grain production. China also increased its support for grain exports with increased emphasis given to encourage the export of processed grain products. In terms of market access, China has done well to honour its WTO accession commitment and TRQ is the only means used by China to influence the access of grain imports to the Chinese market.
A relatively high proportion of the grain TRQs is traded by STEs and the management of the non-STE portion of the TRQs is still not very transparent, though the government has tried to make improvements. Hence, the use of grain TRQs has to some extent limited the imports of grains to China. However, TRQ is only one of the several major factors that have contributed to the low usage of the grain TRQs. Other major factors include: higher prices of imported grains; increased domestic grain production support; and improved availability of higher quality grains produced domestically.
Although it was low in the past five years, the TRQ usage is likely to increase in the future. It is generally held that China's increased grain imports will become unavoidable. In future trade negotiations China may agree to further open up its grain market but may attach conditions such as asking for further opening up of labour intensive product markets by its trading partners. China may also relate its grain and other agricultural product markets opening up to the international movement of production factors such as capital, technology, and labour.
However, in the near future, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will bring significant changes to the current grain trade policies, unless there are drastic progresses with the WTO multilateral trade negotiations or large unexpected changes in domestic grain supply. Government support to encourage grain production is expected to continue and is likely to further increase. It is not anticipated that export support will increase unless there is a temporary glut in domestic production and China needs to export badly. Whether foreign grains will have improved access to the Chinese market will depend on China's domestic supply and demand; however, trading partners having a bilateral FTA with China are expected to have improved access to the Chinese grain market. TRQs will continue to be used by China as its only major means to control grain imports to China. Any changes in the amount of TRQs, the management of TRQs, and the out-quota tariff rates, will be primarily influenced by China's domestic grain supply and also to a great extent by the progress and outcomes of multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. 
